Mesorah 3

A friend and colleague was the rabbi in a suburban New York synagogue. An outstanding scholar, he was displeased with several aspects of his congregation's liturgical practices. Some were peculiarities of that particular community, which he felt were not in conformity with Jewish law. Other things were right in line with American traditional Jewish practice, but his reading of sources led him to propose a "better way" to do things. He was dismissed from his position. I asked one of the heads of his congregation for the reason for his dismissal. He answered "He does not respect our traditions!". Had he said "we have found that his rulings were incorrect", I would have understood and been sympathetic, although I would have questioned their competency to make such a decision. But it wasn't that. "We've always done it this way" clearly trumped a desire to be "right". One may question, then, what is the rabbi for; to teach or to enforce a community's folkways?
Historically, stable, ancient communities maintained traditions for centuries that were passed down from generation to generation. They became a Mesorah. Even there, some rabbis may feel that one or another practice could stand a "tweaking", but few would tamper with an established tradition. In modern day synagogues, often a blend of Jews from varying traditions, compromises are worked out. Sometimes these compromises are made under rabbinical auspices, sometimes not. When a qualified rabbi comes to that community, should he have the right...or obligation... to make corrections? We have here a conflict between Law and Mesorah!
Another case of this conflict is when there is, indeed, a very ancient practice that might no longer be appropriate in the present day reality. An example would be women's participation in observances that were not traditionally done by women. Many aspects of Torah law exempt women. This is especially true of "time bound" commandments, which would tend to interfere with their vital functions as wife and mother. However, the ruling is that although not obligated, they may, in every case, perform these acts should they wish to. It is universally accepted that women hear the Shofar blowing on Rosh HaShanah, eat in the Sukkah and wave the "Four Species" on Sukkot; all actions which are time bound, and from which women are exempt. (There is a difference between Ashkenazim and Sepharadim regarding the recitation of the blessing on these actions). But there are many others that the vast majority of women, in all communities, did not take on, such as the wearing of Tallit and Tefillin. Some present day rabbis feel that in this day and age, when women are educated, and few go down to the river to do the laundry, or slaughter, dress, and cook animals for their family's food, there is no reason for them not to utilize their new found leisure time in performing righteous deeds. Most rabbis, however, fear the possibility...or likelihood...of a slippery slope. Once practices of many centuries are changed because of new circumstances and values, what else will change? A woman may, and should, hear the Shofar. But since she is not under OBLIGATION to hear it, can she blow the Shofar for the synagogue to fulfill the requirement for men? There is zero question that the answer is "no"! But a community that allows, or even encourages, "permissible" innovations, will often start on the slippery slope towards abandoning all law and tradition. On the other hand, many will feel that women denied these expressions of Jewishness will then feel less connected and opt out. In the last few days, a very powerful rabbi issued a statement that a woman may not light Hanukkah candles in the presence of men. Doing so would be a breach of modesty "insulting our ancestors and the great rabbis of previous generations." This, despite the fact that Jewish law is very clear that women's obligation of Hanukkah candles  is identical to men's, and wife may light for her husband. This rabbi is actually falsifying halachah, in order to prevent a theoretical "slippery slope."  Another factor is the question of motivation. Is she doing the non-typical practice because of a spiritual thirst; or is she trying to "break the system"?Those rabbis who oppose innovations of this type will often make the argument that while the innovations don't violate Jewish law, they violate a long standing Mesorah. This can readily be seen in some non-Orthodox communities. They may have started with small innovations, but after a decade or two are no longer recognizable as being traditional Jews.
I have used the women's issue here as an example. But there are many others. Some see such an exra-judicial system as unnecessary, or even stifling. Others see it as essential for maintaining a Jewish identity and the Torah way of life. Most Orthodox rabbis and communities are opposed to these changes, and see Mesorah as a great governing  force in Jewish life.
Please allow me to emphasize that I am not taking sides on this debate. I, and hopefully you, can see the valid arguments on each side. When there was a Sanhedrin, they were entrusted by the Torah to make these decisions. Now, we must make our own decisions, with the guidance of knowledgeable and dedicated leaders. (Although these are few and far between).Is Mesorah an acceptable substitute, at least until a new, valid Sanhedrin is born? Or are we in danger of alienating large numbers of people, thereby destroying Judaism by neglect? Are we encouraging stagnation?May G-d guide us in perceiving His will!

Mesorah 1

One of the difficulties in translating from one language to another, is that a word in the original language, may have more than one meaning. Sometimes, the meanings of one word could be opposites. This is the case with the word "cleave" in English, which can mean "to stick to" (as in cleave to a person) or "divide", (as in to cleave a piece of meat). When translating into another language, we must be certain how the word was used in the original context, or else, our technically correct translation, will, in fact, be a total distortion. Sometimes it is actually difficult to know what the author meant, or the ambiguity may have been an intentional literary device, essentially impossible to translate..
This is the case with the word "Tradition". A tradition may be a custom, like having cranberry sauce with our Thanksgiving turkey. It's not a law; I have yet to hear of anyone arrested for not eating it. Yet, it is a long standing American tradition. If one only had a hamburger on Thanksgiving, he would probably feel that he had missed out, and would spend the next few days regretting the loss, albeit temporary, of this tradition, of which he has memories going back to his earliest childhood, with associations with friends and family, many now gone. He has lost out on a connecting link between past, present and future. Yet, it is not obligatory.
Now let's take a look at England. England has no constitution. It's laws are based on Common Law, much of that going back to the Magna Carta. Essentially, they are Traditions, which have the force of law. One such Tradition is the right to trial by jury. This has become enshrined in our Bill of Rights, as well as in the constitutions of many other countries. If an accused criminal demanded a jury trial, it would be outrageous for the judge to tell him "I don't think so. It's only a custom, and I'm too busy this week to deal with it". True, in England it is only common law, but is, nevertheless, law. It cannot be compared with the cranberry sauce.
In Judaism, the cranberry sauce example would be called "minhag" (custom; a traditional practice). The English trial by jury would be called a "mesorah", which means "to be handed down". Some Mesorot are considered Biblical, although not spelled out in the Torah. For instance, nowhere in the Torah do we have the age of thirteen as the time when a boy becomes enough of a man to be legally considered responsible for his actions, and fully bound by the laws of G-d. However, we have "received" a mesorah that this is the meaning of "a man" in the Torah. This has been handed down by G-d to Moses, and from Moses to the people. It would be ludicrous to think that there is no Torah definition of reaching one's majority, as the courts would have needed to know when to enforce a certain law in the case of a particular person. In fact, we consider this Biblical, not rabbinic. Other things have been enacted by rabbinical courts, as specified in Deuteronomy 17:8-13. They may legislate to strengthen, or "put a fence around" a Torah law. Although they do this by authority of the Torah, nevertheless, it is considered rabbinic law. An example of this would be the eating of Hametz (leavened food) on the day before Passover. The Torah commands to bring the Passover sacrifice on the afternoon of the day before Passover, before Sundown.We are told in the Torah to not bring the Passover "with leaven". We have a Mesorah, going back to Moses, that this means that leaven must be out of our possession by noon of the day before Passover, the time when the sacrifice was offered..We regard this as Biblical. The ancient rabbis forbade eating leaven for two hours before this time, and required having it out of our possession, by one hour before noon, as a "fence" so as not to make an error on a cloudy day. We are careful to note that this is NOT part of the Torah, except as the Torah gives the courts the right and obligation to protect the laws. This is rabbinic law.This, too, is part of the Mesorah, while keeping the two separate and distinct.Otherwise, we would be violating the Torah's prohibition of "you shall not add or detract" from its laws.There will be differences in how it is applied. For instance, in a case of a doubtful situation, in a Biblical law we need to be strict, in a rabbinical law we may be lenient. Now, there may be local traditions surrounding Passover. These are considered Minhag, and depending on the community, they may be regarded as very sacred, albeit not laws. This is especially true in Ashkenazic tradition. In other communities, this is much less the case. I was told by Rabbi Yosef Kappah, a leading Yemenite rabbi "the minhag is to keep a minhag, but there is no legal necessity". In the former cases (an enactment of the Sanhedrin), the Tradition is, in fact, law. In the latter (custom), it is below the level of law, but nevertheless is observed, and honored, as Minhag.
Therefore, when we speak of "Jewish Tradition" we must be very clear of what we mean. Do we mean Mesorah, and, if so, what kind of Mesorah, or do we mean a custom? All are holy, but not all are obligatory in the same way.

Mesorah 2

There are many differences between the Jerusalem and Babylonian Talmuds not only in halachah, but also in ideology. This is especially evident in the area of Mesorah. Both Talmuds recognize the immutability of the laws given to Moses, both in writing and orally, as well as the necessity of obeying the enactments of the Sanhedrin, as commanded in Deuteronomy 17:8-13. However, there is a major difference when it comes to the question of Minhag (custom) in relation to law. The entire topic of Minhag is in a brief section in tractate Pesachim, relating to different traditions as to what may or may not be done on the day before Passover. The Babylonian Talmud is very clear. Customs are geographic and not genetic. A custom may enlarge on an existing tradition, but not detract from it. If one moves temporarily to a place with a different custom, one must abide by the stricter of the two practices. If the move is permanent, one jettisons one's former custom, and conforms to that of his new community. If the Babylonian rabbis encountered a custom which they considered mistaken or baseless, they would oppose it. The Jerusalem Talmud, on the other hand, records cases where rabbis visited communities with odd customs, but upheld those customs themselves while visiting these places. The concept was formulated that custom could even trump a law. These issues later became factors in the differences between Ashkenazi and Sepharadic practices. The original Ashkenazi traditions were those of the Jerusalem Talmud.When the ruling was accepted (about the year 900) that the law follows the Babylonian Talmud, many Eretz Israel traditions were nevertheless maintained. Even if they had no basis in statutory law, the fact that these traditions were ancient made them part of the Mesorah. One modern day Jerusalem posek (legal decisor) wrote a responsum to a question as to why, when dealing with issues of law, he took very lenient stances, while being extremely strict in matters of custom. He answered "when it's a question of law, it's an argument between Rabbi A and Rabbi B. I know how to judge that. When it's a question of custom, I have no idea if it is simply folklore, or an ancient enactment, perhaps going back to Moses! Therefore, I need to be strict!"(Rabbi Shammai Gross of the Belz Beit Din). As new customs came in throughout the ages, the tendency of the Ashkebazi rabbis was to formulate theories as to why they had come about, and sought "hints" in the sources to justify the custom. Sepharadic rabbis, on the other hand, usually fought practices that had no apparent basis. One contemporary Sepharadic posek writes that any custom not mentioned in Talmudic  sources should be assumed to be non-Jewish, and abolished. RAMBAM wrote that no custom is universal unless it came into being by the late fourth century, predating the demise of the last Sanhedrin. Any later customs only have local validity, and none if they contradict the halachah. It was only in the last few centuries, as a result of Jews being uprooted from place to place, did the concept of family custom become widely accepted. This has been rejected by most Sepharadic rabbis. However, most Ashkeanzic and Sephaardic rabbis refrain from openly opposing the other community's customs, seeing peace among the various segments of Jewry as overriding other considerations. Here we have a blurring of the lines between Mesorah, "handed down" Tradition, Custom, and statutory halachah. But some "blurrings" are less founded upon ancients differences of opinions, and more on "extra-halachic" considerations of various kinds. That will be my next post.